Corporate Governance: What about the workers? by Sikka, P
 1
 
 
*CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: WHAT ABOUT THE WORKERS? 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Prem Sikka 
University of Essex 
 
 
 
 
Address for correspondence: 
 
Prem Sikka 
Centre for Global Accountability 
University of Essex 
Colchester 
Essex CO4 3SQ 
UK 
 
E-mail: prems@essex.ac.uk 
 
 2
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: WHAT ABOUT THE WORKERS? 
 
Abstract  
Purpose: To stimulate debates about the creation of corporate governance 
mechanisms and processes which would help to secure an equitable distribution of 
income and wealth for workers. 
 
Methodology/Approach:  The paper builds on a political economy of income and 
wealth inequalities. It argues that corporate governance mechanisms and processes are 
rooted in particular politics and histories. The state is a key actor. It provides a brief 
history of the UK corporate governance debates relating to income distribution, 
industrial democracy and disclosures. It provides social data about the extent of 
income inequalities. 
 
Findings: The paper shows that the UK lacks institutional structures and processes 
and mechanisms to enable workers to secure a higher share of the firm’s income. 
 
Research limitations/implications (if applicable):  The study primarily focuses on 
some aspects of the corporate governance structures, practices and income/wealth 
inequalities in the UK. Its implications could also be relevant to market-oriented 
liberal states with ‘consensus’ or ‘majoritarian’ electoral systems. 
 
Practical implications (if applicable): To encourage debates, the paper puts forward 
a number of suggestions for changing electoral and corporate governance practices 
together with disclosures that could give visibility to income and wealth inequalities. 
 
Originality/value of paper:  The paper links corporate governance debates to broader 
political choices. 
 
Article Type:  A research article that uses a variety of government and institutional 
data sources to highlight shortcomings of corporate governance practices. 
 
Keywords: Governance, Income and Wealth Inequalities, Workers, the state. 
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: WHAT ABOUT THE 
WORKERS? 
 
Introduction 
In recent years, a large volume of literature associated with operations, control, 
accountability and responsibilities of corporations has emerged (for example, Blair, 
1995; Erturk et al., 2004; Monks and Minow, 2004; Solomon and Solomon, 2004; 
Demirag, 2005; Wearing, 2005; Solomon, 2007). It primarily focuses on policies, 
practices, institutional structures, laws, norms and informal arrangements associated 
with the governance of corporations. A large part of this literature privileges the rights 
of shareholders. It pays attention to the relationships between shareholders and 
executive directors, auditors, chairman, chief executives and the board of directors, 
the mix between executive and non-executive directors, executive remuneration and 
the informational needs of capital markets. The literature recognises that in addition to 
shareholders, corporations also have obligations to a variety of stakeholders such as 
employees and suggests a variety of participation and profit sharing schemes to 
extract high economic surpluses (Blair, 1995). However, it rarely requires 
corporations to specifically create structures and processes that would result in 
equitable distribution of wealth even though the investment of human capital is 
crucial to any generation of wealth. 
 
Corporate governance processes matter to workers because they shape “the creation 
of wealth and its distribution into different pockets … the portfolios of pensioners and 
retirees,  … the claims of the rich and the poor ... rewards to entrepreneurial initiative 
… the incentives firms have to invest in their labor force … social welfare, health, 
and retirement plans ...” (Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005, p. 3). Employees, it is argued, 
are entitled to an equitable return on the investment of their human capital because 
they “have made a much greater investment in the enterprise by their years of service, 
may have much less ability to withdraw, and may have a greater stake in the future of 
the enterprise than many of the shareholders” (Clyde Summers cited in Wedderburn, 
2004, p. 44). Despite advances in corporate governance and social responsibility, 
income inequalities in the UK, a comparatively rich country, are increasing (Giddens, 
1998; Darton and Strelitz, 2003; Brewer et al., 2006). Some of  the inequalities may 
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be explained by supply and demand in labour markets, technological substitution, 
demise of the manufacturing sector, expansion of the services sector and globalisation 
(for example see Galbraith and Liu, 2001; Sutcliffe, 2004; Wade, 2005). However, the 
impact of such developments has to be filtered and translated by the politics of 
corporate governance, institutional structures, workers’ rights and policies of the state 
(Fligstein, 2001) and is thus closely connected to national developments.  
 
This paper seeks to encourage debates about the development of corporate 
governance structures and practices that might “ensure that wealth generated is 
distributed equitably” (Mitchell and Sikka, 1996, p. 32; also see Mitchell and Sikka, 
2005, 2006). Its main focus is the distribution of income and wealth in the UK. It is 
organised into three further sections. The next section argues that income and wealth 
inequalities are deeply embedded into market economies. The persistence of 
inequalities is rooted in the UK’s political system which provides inadequate 
incentives for governments to address income inequalities. Under the weight of 
corporate power, governments have failed to develop appropriate corporate 
governance mechanisms or workers’ rights to check rising inequalities. The second 
section shows that in the absence of appropriate corporate governance frameworks, 
distribution of income and wealth is highly skewed and has consequences not only for 
workers, but also for their families. The third and final section summarises and 
discusses the paper. To stimulate debates, it also sketches out some proposals for 
reforms of corporate governance, which would help to give greater visibility to 
inequalities and possibly pave the way for equitable distribution of income and 
wealth.  
 
Wage Inequalities and Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance processes and policies are the outcome of politics that take 
account of particular histories, institutional structures and power relations. Due to 
power asymmetries, inequalities in the distribution and income of wealth are an 
inherent feature of capitalism. Inequalities in the level of wages flow directly from the 
capitalist mode of production (Marx, 1976). Labour, which cannot be stored, is treated 
as a disposable means of production and has to be exploited to increase profits. To 
maximise economic surpluses business enterprises seek to cheapen labour through 
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deskilling, substitution by technologies, product innovations, exploiting gender, 
ethnicity and age inequalities and global mobility of capital. Accounting technologies 
aid such processes because they regard payment to labour as a ‘cost’ whilst payments 
to capital (e.g. dividends) are considered to be a reward. In the prevailing ideology 
‘cost’ is a considered to be a burden which must be reduced or even eliminated. Thus 
considerable attention is paid to reducing labour’s share of the firm’s income. Such 
processes are aided not only by managers, but also by an extended middle class of 
opinion formers, business advisers and consultants who frequently disseminate 
discourses suggesting that a higher financial reward for labour is somehow a threat to 
the stability and wellbeing of societies. Corporate managers and advisers are highly 
rewarded for developing and implementing strategies that increase corporate profits 
and lower labour costs. 
Such strategies may help to increase return on capital, but they have also locked 
capitalist economies into a constant state of crisis (O’Connor, 1987). A higher level of 
wages has a capacity to reduce profits and the rate of return enjoyed by capitalist 
entrepreneurs. It can also have a bearing on the levels of production, investment, 
competition and executive rewards which are often linked to reported profits. 
However, workers are also consumers of goods and services produced by 
corporations. A lower level of wages saps the strength of workers to purchase goods 
and services and thus not enable capitalists to accumulate adequate profits. In this 
context, wages are not determined by supply and demand, as some neo-classical 
economists argue, but by the power of labour. The systemic inequalities in power 
inevitably produce inequalities in wages and incomes. 
The systemic forces have to be translated as corporate governance practices and 
policies. This translation is likely to be uneven as it is the subject of intense 
contestation by a variety of stakeholders (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Capitalist 
economies, such as the UK, function as liberal democracies and have a capacity to 
check income and wealth inequalities. In such societies, the political system seeks to 
build legitimacy by integrating diverse demands into public policies (Habermas, 
1976). The liberal state frequently claims that its policies are geared to reducing 
poverty, checking inequalities and building a just and fair society (Offe et al., 1996). 
Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) argue that in democratic societies workers bring two 
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forms of power to bear on the governance issues: “market power” and “political 
power”. Market power is associated with workers’ rights. Trade unions can bring 
pressures upon employers through co-operation and conflict to increase their 
members’ share of the firm’s income (Burniaux et al., 2006). Workers can withhold 
work through industrial action (strikes and slow downs) to increase labour’s share of 
the firm’s income, pension and welfare rights, possibly at the expense of shareholders 
and capital generally. Such actions may also result in lower labour market 
participation rates. “Market power” is shaped by inherent conflicts and mobilisation 
of political resources or “political power”. Such a model assumes that corporate 
governance outcomes are shaped by electoral outcomes. Assuming that employees’ 
interests are generally aligned with the political left, an electoral tilt to the left creates 
possibilities that workers may be able to claim a higher share of the firm’s income, 
employment and welfare rights. Similarly, a tilt to the right reduces possibilities of 
employee influence on corporate governance systems and an improved share of 
income. However, labour rarely wins any election on its own and the political parties 
have to seek cross-class support from workers, farmers, religious groups, 
shareholders, environmentalists, feminists, ethnic minorities, pensioners and others 
whose interests and policy preferences may conflict. Thus the possibilities of 
equitable distribution of income and wealth are subject to continuous conflicts, 
negotiations and bargaining 
In democratic societies, electoral votes need to be converted to parliamentary 
majorities to form governments and secure control of the levers of public 
policymaking. The UK parliamentary system can be characterised as a ‘majoritarian’ 
system rather than a ‘consensus’ system (Lijphart, 1999). In a ‘consensus’ system (for 
example in Scandanavian countries), the seats in parliament closely reflect the 
proportion of the popular vote and it is rare for a single political party to claim 
parliamentary majority. As a result, government building has to accommodate a wide 
range of opinions and demands to engineer power sharing. Such governments are 
more likely to be susceptible to employees’ demands for rights and equitable 
distribution of income and wealth. In contrast, the Westminster model operated in the 
UK is a ‘majoritarian’ system where a minority share of the popular vote is always 
translated into a majority of the seats in parliament. Due to class politics it can 
produce wide ranging swings in public policies. In a ‘majoritarian’ system, 
 7
governments rarely build coalitions and a large block of public opinion can often be 
overridden by the parliamentarian majority. Thus ‘majoritarian’ governments lack 
strong incentives to build consensus policies and institutional structures to advance 
workers rights and influence on corporate governance mechanisms. Governments 
could accommodate demands from trade unions for a higher share of the employer’s 
income, but such policies have to compete with demands from employers. To secure a 
stable environment, employers could also acquiesce to demands from workers for a 
better share of the firm’s income, but these have to compete with demands from 
shareholders and capital markets. Workers themselves may be unable to present a 
unified front as, for example, some may be keen to maintain wage differentials. The 
ultimate outcomes depend on politics and mobilisation of the state. 
As the state’s reliance on private capital has increased to finance its own expenditures, 
welfare of capital has become central to state policymaking. Corporations also have 
considerable resources to shape public policies through lobbying, sponsored research, 
think-tanks, control of the media, sponsorship of political parties, individual 
politicians and jobs for former and potential ministers. Such resources enable 
corporate interests to secure a particular kind of social order and stability. 
Unsurprisingly, corporations are now considered to be the “most powerful political 
forces of our time [and] ….. the ruling political bodies of our era” (Klein, 2001, p. 
339-340) and their interests inform policies about corporate governance and equitable 
distribution of income and wealth.  
The above forms a background to the UK debates about corporate governance 
processes relating to workers’ rights, wage disclosures and related institutional 
structures. 
After the Second World War, as the UK sought to rebuild its economy, employment 
rates rose and unemployment virtually disappeared (Hobsbawm, 1969). The 
unprecedented economic boom stabilised income inequalities. The establishment of 
wages was left primarily to market mechanisms and the state showed no interest in 
fixing any minimum wage or controlling wages at the higher end. The post-war 
economic affluence soon began to be accompanied by anxieties about low economic 
growth rates, rising levels of inflation, unemployment, international competitiveness 
and the erosion of the value of currency (Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison, 1984). In 
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1964, the Labour Party secured a parliamentary majority with 44% of the popular 
vote. This was followed up in 1967 with 48% of the popular vote and a 96 majority in 
the House of Commons. The Labour manifesto pledged to control the cost of living 
by introducing statutory controls on the levels of increases in wages and prices of 
goods and services (Dorey, 2002). This raised questions about how the regulation of 
wages increases was to be observed, or at least give the impression that it was capable 
of being monitored. In this context, the government introduced the Companies Act of 
1967, which for the first time required companies to publish information about the 
remuneration of employees and directors in their audited annual reports (see Hansard, 
House of Lords Debates, cols. 123-230; House of Commons Debates, 21 February 
1966, col. 36; 14 February 1967, cols. 364-370; 13 June 1967, cols. 328-350). 
Throughout the parliamentary debates, ministers argued that the level of disclosures in 
the company accounts would enable the government to monitor compliance with the 
'prices and incomes' controls and judge whether its policy had been breached. 
Disclosures in annual reports could also give visibility to wage differentials, gender 
and race discrimination and inequalities, but there was little concern about such 
matters, or even a minimal wage for workers, though the 1967 Act required directors 
to ‘have regard to the interests of employees’ in making decisions. Such duties were, 
however, subordinated to the pursuits of shareholder interests. The 1967 legislation 
was subsequently revised and Section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006 now states 
that “A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would 
be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members 
as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to ..… the interests of 
the company’s employees”. 
The Companies Act 1967 (subsequently consolidated into the Companies Act 1985 
and revised by the Companies Act 2006) required that the audited annual financial 
reports of UK-based companies (there are some exemptions for small and medium-
size companies) need to show selected details of the directors' remuneration1 and 
identify the 'highest paid director', if s/he is not the chairman of the company. The 
company must disclose the total amount of wages and salaries paid in a financial year 
(The Companies Act 1985, Schedule 4, paragraph 56(4) and the average number of 
persons employed under contracts of services in the financial year2. Disclosures about 
the mean, mode or median wage and wage distribution by gender, age and ethnicity 
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could raise public awareness of institutionalised discrimination and inequalities, but 
such disclosures were not considered. The Companies Act 1967 also required 
summary disclosures of the ‘higher paid employees’ categorised into financial 
brackets mentioned by the Act. 
The above disclosures remained in place even though the Labour administration was 
replaced by the Conservative Party from 1970 to February 1974. The Labour Party, 
with closer affiliation to trade unions, returned to office in 1974 with a manifesto 
promise to “bring about a fundamental and irreversible shift in the balance of power 
and wealth in favour of working people and their families … Eliminate poverty 
wherever it exists in Britain … Make power in industry genuinely accountable to the 
workers and the community at large. … Achieve far greater economic equality - in 
income, wealth and living standards …3”. To combat gender and racial discrimination 
in employment and other spheres it introduced the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and 
the Race Relations Act 1976. These Acts required employers to keep extensive 
records but companies were not required to give public visibility to their practices by 
publishing any information about the level of wage payments to women or workers 
from ethnic minorities. 
In 1975, a Green Paper from the European Economic Community (EEC) 
recommended that to enhance ‘industrial democracy’ employees should have direct 
representation on company boards (EEC, 1975). In response, a report commissioned 
by the UK government suggested that workers of large companies should elect 
representatives on company boards, equal in number to those of the shareholders’ 
representatives (Bullock, 1977). Such proposals had the potential to advance 
employee interests and possibly influence their share of a firm’s income, but under the 
weight of opposition from corporate interests and a resurgence of the new-right they 
were abandoned (Wedderburn, 2004). For most of its term in office (1974 to 1979), 
the Labour administration was enmeshed in managing a deepening economic crisis 
indicated by rising unemployment, inflation rates, budgetary deficits and  balance of 
payments crisis and did not return to the issue of ‘industrial democracy’. 
There were also possibilities of reforming financial reporting practices (Accounting 
Standards Steering Committee, 1975). The proposals gave some recognition to the 
rights of employees as stakeholders and encouraged experimentation. Some attempts 
 10
were made to supplement the traditional financial statements with reports directed at 
employees and showing how the firm’s wealth was being shared by shareholders and 
employees (Gray and Maunders, 1980). Some considered such reforms to be an 
attempt to manage workers’ perceptions rather than a serious attempt to transform 
capitalist social relations and increase workers’ share of the firm’s income (Burchell 
et al., 1985). However, with the worsening economic crisis and the rise of the new-
right the support for reforms weakened and they were abandoned. 
In 1979, under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, the Conservative Party won the 
UK general election with 43.9% of the popular vote, which was translated into 53.4% 
of the parliamentary seats and a majority of 43 seats in the House of Commons. The 
government had a strong ideological agenda which marked a “decisive break with the 
postwar consensus” (Hall, 1988, p. 2). It blamed the excessive powers of trade 
unions4 for UK’s economic decline and made ‘free markets’ a priority. To restore 
corporate profits, it engaged, sometimes violently, with trade unions and abolished the 
‘closed shop’, made prior balloting compulsory for all strike actions (previously 
strikes could be agreed by a show of hands at union meetings), diluted secondary 
picketing (not secondary production or relocation of production facilities) and under 
certain circumstances trade unions could be sued for damages caused by industrial 
action. It also privatised many state owned industries and thus reduced the job 
security available to workers (Letwin, 1992). The Thatcherite reforms, accompanied 
by a decline of the unionised manufacturing sector, drastically reduced the “market 
power” of many employees. In 1979, UK trade unions had nearly 13 million (or 
55.4% of the workforce) members5, but by 1996 it shrank to less than 6 million before 
rising to 6.68 million (out of a workforce of 29 million) in 2005 (UK Department of 
Trade and Industry, 2005). Commentators noted that during “the 1980s, whilst median 
income rose by 28 per cent in real terms, that of the bottom quarter rose by only 15 
per cent, and that of the bottom 10 per cent by only 6 per cent. ….. Many millions of 
people are unable to afford goods and services that the majority deem necessary” 
(Darton and Strelitz 2003, p.7). The Conservative administration did not introduce a 
minimum wage or curb salaries at the higher end. During the 1980s, the Low Pay 
Unit, an organisation representing poorly paid workers, used the 'higher paid 
employees' disclosures required by the Companies Act 1967 (see above) to highlight 
 11
the increase in wage inequalities. The government responded by repealing the 
disclosure requirements6 (Cousins and Sikka, 1993).  
In 1990, Margaret Thatcher was replaced as Prime Minister by John Major (1990-
1997), but there were no policy changes to alleviate growing income inequalities. 
Following the 1990s high profile financial scandals at Maxwell, Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International (BCCI), Polly Peck and others, public attention focused on 
excessive financial rewards for company executives, especially at poorly performing 
companies. Such concerns drew attention to the ineffectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms. The government did not introduce legislation or invite any 
parliamentary committee to investigate matters. Instead, it was content for ‘private 
interests’ to formulate a response. In May 1991, a committee under the chairmanship 
of Sir Adrian Cadbury (known as “Cadbury Committee”) was formed to draft a 
voluntary code on corporate governance. Its December 1992 report (Committee on the 
Financial aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992) sought to legitimise executive 
rewards by emphasising that “shareholders are entitled to a full and clear statement of 
directors’ present and future benefits and how they have been determined” (p. 31). It 
recommended the creation of remuneration committees, essentially a sub-committee 
of the main executive board, mainly staffed by non-executive directors, to make 
recommendations on executive pay. The Committee showed no interest in equitable 
distribution of income/wealth or reducing inequalities and did not recommend any 
public disclosures about low pay, gender and ethnicity wage differentials or changes 
to board structures to consider the equitable distribution of wealth7.  
In 1994, the European Works Council (EWC) Directive issued by the European 
Union (EU) recommended that all companies operating across the EU and employing 
more than 1,000 workers in at least two countries, irrespective of their home base, 
should form a works council for information and consultation with employee 
representatives. The UK exercised its opt-out and did not legislate to implement the 
directive. The continuing media exposure about excessive financial rewards to 
directors of major companies (Solomon and Solomon, 2004; Solomon, 2007) led to 
the formation of another Committee in 1995, under the chairmanship of Marks & 
Spencer chairman Sir Richard Greenbury (Greenbury Committee, 1995). The 
Greenbury Committee again emphasised the shareholders right to know and the 
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obligations of directors of listed companies to be accountable to shareholders. It 
recommended that information should be provided on each element of directors' 
remuneration. Companies were asked to provide separate aggregate figures relating to 
basic pay, share options, long term incentive schemes and money purchase pension 
schemes with the recommendation that a report should be sent to shareholders each 
year explaining the company's approach to executive remuneration and providing full 
disclosure of all elements in the remuneration of individual directors8.  
Nevertheless, public concern with excessive financial rewards for company directors 
continued and led to the formation of another Committee, in 1996, under the 
chairmanship of ICI chairman Sir Ronald Hampel (Solomon, 2007). In common with 
earlier private sector committees, it did not have any representatives from workers or 
trade unions. Its 1998 report (Committee on Corporate Governance, 1998) reiterated 
the earlier recommendations of the Cadbury and Greenbury Committees and was 
sceptical about the usefulness of executive remuneration disclosures with claims that 
“ful1 disclosure of individual directors’ total emoluments has led to an upward 
pressure on remuneration in a competitive field” (para 4.5). It was content to see 
remuneration committees fix executive financial rewards, but did not believe that 
directors’ remuneration should be subjected to a specific shareholder vote at the 
annual general meeting. However, such a requirement subsequently became part of 
The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations in 2002 and is now included in the 
Companies Act 2006.  
 
In 1997, the Conservative party lost the general election. With 43.2% of the popular 
vote, the incoming Labour administration secured 63.6% of the parliamentary seats. It 
could have pursued a radical agenda, especially as the “median income of the richest 
tenth of the population increased by over 60 per cent in real terms between 1979 and 
1996/97 whereas that of the poorest tenth rose by only 11 per cent … even fell by 13 
per cent if income is measured by after housing costs” (cited in Butler and Watt, 
2007, p.1; also see Elliott and Atkinson, 1998; Bradshaw and Wallace, 1996). 
Commentators noted that the "gap between the highest-paid and the lowest-paid 
workers is greater than it has been for at least fifty years” (Giddens, 1998, p. 105) and 
that the “share of the GDP going to workers in the form of wages and salaries reduced 
from its peak of 65.1% in 1975 to 52.6% in 1996” (Compass, 2007, p. 21). However, 
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the government did not reverse the Thatcherite trade union reforms and did not have 
any proposals for industrial democracy. The Prime Minister indicated his satisfaction 
that “British law is the most restrictive on trade unions in the western world” (cited in 
Compass, 2007, p. 22). The government was content for private interests, particularly 
the Hampel Committee established in 1996, to make the running on corporate 
governance issues. Upon coming to office, the Labour administration immediately 
appointed British Petroleum’s chairman and Hampel Committee member Sir David 
Simon (later Lord Simon of Highbury) as Trade Minister with a key role in corporate 
governance matters. There were no equivalent elevations for any worker 
representatives. The subsequent private sector controlled corporate governance 
Committees (Turnbull Report, 1999; Higgs Review, 2003; Smith Report, 2003) were 
content with the status-quo and did not advance the debate on executive pay 
disclosures or “market power” of workers. Despite concerns for ‘principles’ of 
corporate governance none of the ‘private’ sector reports required companies to 
undertake equitable distribution of income/wealth. Nevertheless, despite opposition 
from corporate interests (Thornley and Coffey, 1999), the Labour administration 
introduced the National Minimum Wage Act 1998, which set the minimum wage for 
workers9. The government did not compel employers to pay what some commentators 
call a ‘living wage10’ to workers as that was considered to interfere with the market 
mechanisms and might possibly have a negative effect on UK’s competitiveness 
(Abrams, 2002; Toynbee, 2003). Instead it sought to manage poverty through a 
variety of means-tested tax credits and social security benefits to boost the income of 
low-paid households (Hills, 2005).  
 
Periodically, the government ministers and opinion formers refer to the high executive 
salaries and widening income inequalities as “grotesque” and “distasteful” (Financial 
Times, 13 November 2006; The Independent, 24 November 2006; The Observer, 17 
December 2006), but corporate interests urge the “government not to legislate against 
‘fat cat’ pay” and claim that “transparency and shareholder activism are the way to 
police directors' pay, not legislation11". Ministers state that "we are not in the business 
of controlling the level of directors' pay" (Accountancy Age, 21 October 1999, p. 25) 
and that “we have no problems with big rewards for big success ….12, but continue to 
urge workers to accept below the rate of inflation wage increases. 
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Overall, under the weight of corporate power, successive UK governments have 
shown little interest in developing any links between corporate governance and 
equitable distribution of income and wealth. Such issues do not form part of the 
Companies Acts13, or a variety of ‘private’ corporate governance initiatives 
encouraged by the state (Committee on the Financial aspects of Corporate 
Governance, 1992; Greenbury Committee, 1995; Committee on Corporate 
Governance, 1998; Turnbull Report, 1999; Higgs Review, 2003; Smith Report, 2003). 
In the absence of appropriate institutional structures and workers’ rights, the space for 
the development of corporate governance mechanisms appropriate for equitable 
distribution of income and wealth has been squeezed and inequalities are now 
institutionalised. 
 
Patterns of Income and Wealth Inequality and Their Consequences 
 
The growing income inequalities in the UK and their consequences have been noted 
by commentators (for example, Giddens, 1998; Hill, 2005; Brewer et al., 2006). 
Successive governments had hoped that remuneration committees would check 
excessive executive remuneration, but they seem to be unable or unwilling to do so. 
At UK’s 100 biggest quoted companies, executive pay increased 17 times faster than 
the average pay. For every £100 earned by a top company director in 2000 they 
earned £205 (after allowing for inflation) in 2006, while ordinary employees received 
an average increase of £6 (after allowing for inflation) in every £100 for the same 
period14 (The Times, 28 December 2006). In 2005, FTSE100 directors pay rose by 
28% compared to an average earnings rise of 3.7% (The Guardian, 3 October 2006). 
One survey15 estimated that in 2005 the median total remuneration of a FTSE100 
chief executive was £2.329 million whilst the chief executives of FTSE250 companies 
recorded a median total remuneration of £878,000. The same survey also reported that 
“Too many companies are paying executives for achievements against targets with 
marginal relevance to the corporate strategy and the value proposition it puts to 
shareholders" (KPMG, 2006; The Guardian, 18 September 2006). Another survey 
reported that the remuneration of FTSE100 chief executives increased by 40 per cent 
in the past year, whilst the FTSE100 share price index climbed by just 7.5 per cent 
over the same period. In 2001 the average chief executive's total remuneration stood 
at £1.7 million, equivalent to the annual average earnings of 90 workers. By late 2006, 
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it had risen to £2,864,28216, equivalent to the average wage of about 127 workers 
(The Daily Telegraph, 24 September 2006). The directors of UK's 10 biggest 
companies had an average remuneration package of £5.8 million, an increase of 12 
per cent more in 2006 than in the previous year (The Observer, 15 April 2007). 
Finance directors at UK’s biggest 100 companies chalked up an annual rise of 22% to 
take their median annual salary to £1.7 million. Non-executive directors, policing 
executive remuneration and staffing corporate remuneration committees, received an 
average annual increase of 13% (The Times, 16 October 2006), with some getting 
18%. Those at FTSE 350 companies received £40,000, whilst those at FTSE 100 
companies received an average £48,800. Some picked up £95,000 for just 25 days a 
year work, over four times the UK annual median salary. At Goldman Sachs, one of 
its directors received an annual bonus of £51 million (The Guardian, 20 December 
2006), 25 of the company's senior bankers received bonuses of more than £25 million 
(The Daily Telegraph, 13 December 2006) and its dealing staff is estimated to have 
received average payment in the region of £300,000 (The Observer, 17 December 
2006). The company refused to increase the wages of its London office contract 
cleaners from £6.70 an hour to £7.05 an hour, equivalent to about £14,500 a year (The 
Observer, 17 December 2006). In 2006, the number of lawyers earning over £1 
million rose to 200 (The Times, 10 May 2007). Managers of the richest 100 hedge 
funds earned over £25 million each though some received as much as £250 million 
(The Observer, 29 April 2007). For 2006, the average wage in the City of London, a 
square mile that is home to much of the finance industry, hit £51,159 (London 
Evening Standard, 25 May 2007) and the average annual salary of a UK chartered 
accountant was around £80,00017.  
 
The remuneration of ordinary workers remains on an entirely different scale. The 
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings published by the UK government18 in October 
2006 showed that the median gross annual earnings (i.e. before tax) for full-time male 
workers is £25,800 (£25,100 in 2005) and £20,100 (£19,400 in 2005) for full-time 
female workers. Official statistics show that median earnings for all employees were 
£23,600 per annum (compared to £22,900 in 2005). 75% of all workers had a gross 
annual wage of less than £29,000. The top 10% had earnings of over £886 per week 
(around £46,000 a year), while the bottom 10% earned less than £244 per week (or 
£12,700 per annum). Around 5.3 million workers, including home, migrant and 
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temporary workers, earn below one-third of the median hourly wage19. Full-time 
female workers on average earned 17% less than men in comparable jobs (Women 
and Work Commission, 2006). Anyone striving for median income, but earning the 
2006 national minimum wage of £5.35, would need to work for about 85 hours each 
week. Many households have to rely on two incomes and employees have to work 
overtime, or even take on additional part-time work to make ends meet, leaving 
precious little time for family life. Nearly 25% of all UK workers work for more than 
48 hours per week, higher than the EU recommended norm, the highest proportion in 
any western country (Servais et al., 2007). Due to low pay in their early working life 
and struggles to raise families, 21% of 30 to 39-year-olds are estimated to work 60 
hours or more each week20.  
 
The above statistics mask sectoral practices. An earlier study showed that young and 
mature workers and those working in retail, supermarkets, and restaurants received 
low wages (Sikka et al., 1999).  Despite highly profitable businesses, some company 
directors resent paying even the minimum wage (Appendix 1 lists some of excuses). 
Due to government legislation some 336,000 employees (i.e. below the age of 22) 
earn less than the minimum wage21. Trade unions estimate that in 2006, some 150,000 
UK workers22 were still being paid less than their entitlement of the minimum wage23. 
By using its network of 120 enforcement officers (for the entire country), the 
government recovered £3 million24 for those who had been illegally denied the 
minimum wage25. Only one employer has ever been prosecuted for violating the 
minimum wage laws (Toynbee, 2007). 
 
In 2005/06, nearly 12.6 million Britons (out of nearly 59 million) lived below the 
poverty line (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2007). The poverty rate for minority ethnic 
groups stands at 40%, approximately double the 20% found amongst white British 
people. Despite corporate pledges of equal opportunities, 65% of Bangladeshis, 55% 
of Pakistanis, 45% of Black Africans and 30% of Indians and Black Caribbeans live 
below the poverty line (Platt, 2007). In 2004/05, 86 per cent of children in 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi households in the UK were in the bottom 40 per cent of 
households ranked by disposable income compared with 49 per cent of all children26. 
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The poor cannot dip into some reservoir of savings as inequalities in income 
inevitably have cumulative effects. The official statistics (Table 1) show that the 
wealthiest 1% owned approximately 21% of the UK's total marketable wealth in 
2003. The top 10% owned 53% of the wealth and half of the population has only 7% 
of total wealth.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
If the value of the dwelling is taken out of the above table, institutionalised 
inequalities become even starker and have worsened since 1976. Table 2 shows that 
since 1976, the top 1% of the population has got richer. In 2003, it owned 34% of the 
wealth. The top 50% have got richer still and owned 99% of the wealth. The share of 
the poorest 50% has declined to just 1% of wealth. 23% of the adult population has 
wealth of less than £5,00027.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
In the absence of appropriate corporate governance practices, income and wealth 
inequalities have been translated into low pensions and retirement insecurity for 
millions. Directors of FTSE100 companies receive pensions worth up to 40 times 
more than those of their staff. A typical director of a FTSE100 company can look 
forward to a pension of £168,000 a year, equivalent to more than £3,200 a week 
(Trades Union Congress, 2006). This compares to an average of £7,124 a year for 
their staff.  In September 2006, an investigation of the accounts of the FTSE100 
company directors by Labour Research revealed that at retirement, on average they 
will receive 71 times the basic state pension for a married couple. A total of 112 
FTSE 100 company directors were entitled to a pension worth at least £200,000 a year 
(Labour Research, 2006). Twenty-seven of them can expect a pension of at least 
£500,000 a year - the equivalent of £9,615 a week.  A sample of such pensions is 
shown in Table 3. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Table 3 shows that the annual pension entitlement of some directors exceeds the 
lifetime earnings of many employees. Labour Research (2006) also found that 
directors at pharmaceutical giant AstraZeneca can retire at 50. Directors of financial 
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services provider Friends Provident and energy group BG can retire at 55 with no 
reduction in their pension. While the average retirement age is 65 for men and 60 for 
women, nearly 8 out of 10 bosses of major UK companies retire at 60 (The Guardian, 
24 November 2005). Over three-quarters (77) of the companies that make up the 
FTSE 100 index still have "final salary" pension schemes for their directors.  
 
Yet even the modicum of retirement security available to workers is being eroded as 
companies chase ever higher profits and despite numerous claims of ‘corporate social 
responsibility’ show little regard for the welfare of their employees. Major 
corporations, including Abbey National, Clydesdale and Yorkshire Bank, 
GlaxoSmithKline, Barclays, BBC, Friends Provident, HBOS, IBM, ICI, Iceland, 
Legal & General, Lloyds TSB, Marks & Spencer, Nationwide, Rolls Royce, Thomas 
Cook, Royal Bank of Scotland and Whitbread have closed final salary pension 
schemes to new employees or abandoned them altogether, or require employees to 
pay more for lower pension benefits. According to surveys published by the National 
Association of Pension Funds, some 67% of all final salary schemes in the private 
sector are closed to new staff and the closures are accelerating (The Guardian, 21 
February 2007). This rapid rate of pension scheme closures means that only 40 per 
cent of today’s workers (11.3 million) are members of an occupational scheme, and 
the proportion in the final salary scheme is declining. The new norm may be lower 
pensions linked to average lifetime earnings, effectively resulting in lower pensions in 
return for higher pension contributions and longer working lives. Companies are 
reducing their contribution to occupational pension schemes and forcing employees to 
pay more, effectively a wage cut for most employees. One study28 estimates that for a 
final salary scheme employers might have contributed 15%-16% of the employee 
salary, whilst for an average salary scheme it is 7%-8%, improving corporate profits 
by £4.15 billion a year, though this figure would increase as degradation of pension 
schemes accelerates. Another study29 estimated that in 2005, employees of the 
pension schemes in the largest 100 companies contributed on average 4.6% of their 
salary. In 2006, this rose to 5.2% and will continue to rise. In many cases, employers 
are paying an average of 7% of staff’s pay into a money purchase scheme, which is 
about half the average paid into a final salary scheme30.   
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In the face of inequalities, only 35% of women are able to save for a pension of their 
own. The percentage of UK population saving adequately for retirement has fallen 
from 55% in 2005 to 46% in 2006, while the number unable to save for pensions rose 
from 17% in 2005 to 28% in 2006 (Scottish Widows, 2006). The government 
statistics show that in 2007 the UK savings ratio, the amount of money people are 
saving, has fallen to its lowest for the last 50 years (The Guardian, 30 June 2007). 
Around 37% of the population as a whole does not have any material amount of 
money that it could readily access to meet emergencies. The UK state manages 
poverty by offering a variety of means-tested tax credits and social security benefits to 
top up the income of the poorest households. Social security cash benefits, funded 
through taxation, make up 60 per cent of gross income for the poorest fifth of 
households and 36 per cent for the next group (Mitchell and Sikka, 2006). Whilst it 
helps many to survive, it has done little to enhance their quality of life, or reduce 
institutionalised inequalities in the distribution of wealth and with it access to social 
and material goods and services. Even before the erosion of recent pension rights (see 
above) nearly 3.03 million pensioners (2.5 million households), including over 2 
million women, rely on social security benefits (or pension credits) to support them31. 
In 2003/4, single women pensioners had a median income of £141 per week whilst 
men had £164 per week. Following huge government support for pensioners, the 
median net income before housing costs of pensioner households headed by someone 
from a white ethnic group reached £204 per week in 2004/5 compared with £185 and 
£151 respectively for those headed by black and Asian pensioners. Black and ethnic 
minority pensioners are more likely to be poor, with 29 per cent in households with 
incomes below 60 per cent of the median, compared with 19 per cent of older white 
people. Despite the biggest social security support offered to pensioners during the 
last 40 years, around 2.5 million pensioners still live below the poverty line (60% of 
median population income before housing costs) equivalent to £128 a week per 
pensioner in 2006 (National Pensioners Convention, 2006). Around 1.4 million 
pensioners (14% of total) survive on £5,000 or less a year, which averages to just 
£3,000 per year or £8.49 a day after local taxes, water and electricity bills32. This 
struggle to live on £8.49 a day, could affect some people for another 25 years of their 
lives. People make ends meet by searching for cheap food and second hand clothes, 
reducing heating costs and medication bills and not using telephone or transport to 
keep in touch with family and friends. 38% of UK pensioners have an annual income 
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of £10,000 or less and more than 50% live on £15,000 or less (see Mitchell and Sikka, 
2006 for some details). 
 
The inequitable distribution of wealth has serious personal and social consequences. 
At the beginning of 2007, the average cost of a home in the UK stood at around 
£200,000, and even higher in some regions. This is beyond the reach of the average 
worker, requiring borrowings of around eight times the average earnings just to get on 
the housing ladder. For the first time in fifty years, home ownership is in decline (The 
Times, 26 March 2007). First time house buyers with an annual income of £34,000 
could be spending an average 51% of their take-home pay on mortgage repayments 
(The Observer, 9 September 2007). Since 2002/03, after taking account of mortgage 
payments, local taxes and rising costs of water, gas, electricity and transport, a typical 
family with two children has seen its disposable income shrink by £82 a month (The 
Guardian, 30 June 2006). Due to low income, many people are having children later 
in life and also getting on the housing ladder later. They continue to pay loans and 
debts until later in life. People in the age group 40 to 59 owe an average of around 
£34,45633. Around 27% of people aged over 50 have virtually no liquid savings. 37% 
of the population as a whole does not have any money that it could readily access 
(Mitchell and Sikka, 2006) 
 
Income inequalities and the related lack of access to good food, healthcare, education 
and quality of life have deadly effects. It is widely acknowledged that “gap in health 
between those at the top and bottom of the social scale has widened” (Acheson, 1998, 
p. 5). Research published by the Chartered Society of Physiotherapy noted “that the 
poorer die younger”34. Those from the poorest areas of the UK can expect to live 
nearly 12 years less than those in the affluent parts. British children are four times 
more likely to die from accidents, have twice the rate of long-standing illnesses and 
are smaller at birth and shorter in height compared to their European Union 
counterparts. In the UK around 40,000 underweight babies (5lb 8 oz or 2.5 kg) are 
born every year, almost the worst rate in the western world (Daily Telegraph, 27 
March 2007). About two-thirds of all stillbirths and 70 per cent of deaths within a 
week of birth were among babies in this group. In 1989, 67 of every 1,000 babies fell 
into that category but the proportion rose to 76 by 1999 and 78 by 2006. Infant death 
rates for the poorest social groups are 19 per cent higher than for the total population. 
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In 2001-2003, six infant deaths per 1,000 live births were recorded among the least 
affluent, compared with 3.5 per 1,000 in professional and managerial groups (UK 
Department of Health, 2005). Despite record government support to alleviate child 
poverty, in 2005/2006, 2.8 million children lived in households with incomes below 
60% of the national median income. This figure rose to 3.8 million after housing costs 
were factored in (UK Department of Work and Pensions, 2007). In a league table 
assessing the well-being of children in 21 industrialised nations, UK came last 
(UNICEF, 2007). 
 
 Due to inadequate income some 4 million UK households cannot adequately heat 
their homes (UK House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee, 2002). Each 
winter, nearly 25,000 elderly people die of cold because they cannot afford to heat 
their homes35. Four out of 10 older people admitted to hospital are suffering from 
malnutrition on arrival (Age Concern, 2006). Due to poor housing and living 
conditions unlike any other EU country, Tuberculosis (abbreviated as TB) is on the 
increase in the UK. In 2006, there were 8,171 cases compared to 5,798 in 199236. 
Poorer people cannot expect help from banks as they are not considered to be 
profitable business opportunities. Indeed, 11% of UK adults do not have a bank 
account and in some poorer areas this rises to 35%37. The poor find it difficult to get 
credit and pay more for goods and services. Energy prices have soared, but the poor 
pay even more because they need to prepay. They use prepaid meters and pay £173 a 
year more for gas and £113 more for electricity than customers who are billed 
quarterly (The Guardian, 4 September 2006). With rampant income inequalities, the 
UK has become the debt capital of the world and its citizens are responsible for a third 
of all unsecured debt in Europe. The UK lending on credit cards, loans and overdrafts 
was £215 billion in 2005 compared to a total of £600 billion for the rest of Europe 
(The Guardian, 27 September 2006). On average Britons owe £3,175 compared to 
£1,558 for European counterparts. Yet the corporate governance literature rarely 
connects with income inequality or its consequences. 
 
Summary and Discussion 
This paper began by arguing that workers are major stakeholders in business 
organisations. They help to generate wealth by investment of their blood, sweat, brain, 
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brawn and skills. Though a number of scholars have used globalisation, trade, 
technology, education and other factors to explain income inequalities, they rarely 
examine the presence or absence of corporate governance mechanisms to achieve 
equitable distribution of wealth. A central claim of this paper is that corporate 
governance mechanisms and processes are shaped by particular histories, conflicts 
and politics. Thus the structural forces shaping corporate governance mechanisms and 
sharing of a firm’s income are translated unevenly. In that context, the state is a major 
site. It was argued that the UK’s ‘majoritorian’ electoral system translates a minority 
share of the popular votes into a parliamentary majority and thus reduces incentives 
for governments to take account of a large block of public opinion. Workers may seek 
improved rights and a more equitable share of the firm’s wealth, but the political 
system is not necessarily responsive as it seems to be relatively less concerned about 
enhancing the ‘market power’ of workers. The interests of capital are also deeply 
embedded in state policymaking and since the late 1970s the state has pursued 
policies to improve corporate profits, possibly to attract more investment to the UK. 
The corporate elites (Committee on the Financial aspects of Corporate Governance, 
1992; Committee on Corporate Governance, 1998; Greenbury Committee, 1995) 
accommodated by the state have primarily been concerned with legitimising rewards 
at the higher end of the pay scale and have eschewed concerns about equitable 
distribution of income. Despite allusions to ‘principles’ based corporate governance 
there are no corporate structures, policies or processes to achieve an equitable 
distribution of income and wealth. Such politics have not enabled the UK to develop 
suitable corporate governance structures and processes for the equitable distribution 
of income and wealth. Weakened trade unions have not been able to mobilise 
pressures for improved distribution of income. The UK laws do not require companies 
to have worker representatives on company boards, or works councils to consult 
workers on matters relating to how the firm’s wealth might be shared. Companies are 
not required to give visibility to inequitable sharing of income by publishing the mean 
or median wages paid to women or workers from ethnic minorities. The minimum 
wage no doubt helped some workers, but many employers do not comply with the 
legal requirements and the enforcement is poor. 
In the relative absence of suitable corporate governance processes and structures, the 
workers’ share of the GDP has been reduced. As noted earlier, the share of the GDP 
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going to workers in the form of wages and salaries declined from its peak of 65.1% in 
1975 to 52.6% in 1996” (Compass, 2007, p. 21). This period coincided with 
considerable restructuring of the state and society. The state actively pursued policies 
to weaken trade unions’ power and workers’ rights, effectively diluting their “market 
power”. Since 1997, the Labour administration has continued with many of the 
previous policies with one notable exception. It introduced the national minimum 
wage which may have lifted the incomes of many. By 2006, possibly this helped to 
raise the workers’ share of GDP from 52.6% in 1996 to 55.6% in 200638, still nearly 
10% less than in 1975. However, this reduced share is then divided unevenly among 
company executives, financial dealers, accountants, lawyers, white-collar, blue-collar, 
ethnic minority and other workers. 
 
In the UK, a comparatively rich country, the income inequalities are increasing. These 
are not due to some squeeze on company profits. For 2006, the average profitability of 
the non-financial UK sector is estimated to be at a record 15.2 per cent, with the 
services sector achieving 19.3% and the oil and gas sector making 42.9% (UK Office 
for National Statistics, 2007). Between 2003 and 2006, the top 100 companies 
doubled their profits (The Daily Telegraph, 7 January 2007). UK workers have one of 
the longest working hours in Europe and boost corporate profits by £23 billion a year 
through unpaid overtime39, but they cannot look forward to an equitable distribution 
of income and wealth. At the top end of the wage and salaries scale commentators 
frequently rationalise higher financial rewards by appeals to market mechanisms and 
claim that to attract good executives high salaries need to be paid.  Such explanations 
pay little attention to politics of governance or power of elite networks. Education and 
skills are considered to be paths to higher rewards but the proportion of women 
graduates working in low-paid jobs has nearly trebled in the past 10 years (The 
Observer, 5 February 2007). Such outcomes are not due to some invisible hand of fate 
or some iron law of economics, but are the outcomes of politics of corporate 
governance that pay little attention to equitable distribution of income that the 
workers themselves have helped to generate.  
 
Income inequalities cause poverty and have negative effects on access to education, 
housing, food, healthcare, pensions and life expectancy. Inequalities skew political 
processes since the wealthy are able to advance their interests through sponsorship of 
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political parties, lobbying and funding of think-tanks. Lack of resources for education 
and training also reduce labour market mobility. The deepening divide between the 
rich and the poor undermines social solidarity, creates disillusionment with 
democracy and obstructs the development of a just and fair society that enables 
citizens to live fulfilling lives. 
  
Rather than creating suitable corporate governance processes, the UK state has sought 
to manage poverty a variety of social security benefits to improve the total income of 
the low income households. However, such a policy has severe limits as corporations 
and wealthy elites resent paying taxes and are increasingly opting out of their 
obligations through a variety of tax avoidance schemes and the tax burden is being 
shifted on to labour and consumption (Sikka and Hampton, 2005; Christensen and 
Murphy, 2004; Mitchell and Sikka, 2006). An effective reform of corporate 
governance to achieve equitable distribution remains the only viable long-term policy 
option. Whilst good voluntary governance practices can be encouraged, it is doubtful 
that the private sector corporate governance codes will do much to improve the 
workers’ share of the firm’s income. Ultimately, the lawmaking powers of the state 
would need to be mobilised to create the appropriate corporate governance 
mechanisms and policies. The state’s need to secure legitimacy through mass public 
support can open spaces for politics, alliances and advancement of discourses that 
appeal to democracy, citizens’ rights, justice, fairness, accountability, ethics and 
equity to mobilise changes to the overall structure and operations of businesses 
(Gallhofer and Haslam, 2003).  
 
The nature of reforms is difficult to predict, but the evidence cited in this paper would 
suggest that changes would need to be made to the UK electoral system so that 
political parties cannot continue to marginalise a large block of public opinion. 
Workers’ “market power” would need to be strengthened so that they have more 
options for securing a higher share of the firm’s income. Since worker rights and trade 
unions are considered to be a positive influence on equitable distribution of a firm’s 
income (Burniaux et al., 2006), debates about ‘industrial democracy’ (Bullock Report, 
1977) and worker representation at company boards would need to be developed. In 
common with shareholders, workers too should vote on executive remuneration, 
attend general meetings, table resolutions and ask questions. At Semco in Brazil, 
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teams of employees interview the candidates vying to become their boss (Shah and 
Goss, 2007). Since the UK state defines the ‘poverty line’ as equivalent to 60% of the 
median wage, it follows that appropriate structures should be created so that no 
company pays a wage below that. The concept of the minimum wage could be 
supplemented by the concept of a ‘maximum wage’. For example, it could be argued 
that company directors should not receive total remuneration of (say) more than ten 
times the average wage in the same company, thus ensuring that extra rewards for 
directors also lead to better rewards for employees (Mitchell and Sikka, 2005, 2006). 
The details of such processes can be developed and scrutinised by works councils, 
remuneration committees or other representative structures.  
 
To inform debates about income inequalities, the total wages and salaries costs 
disclosures already made by companies should be supplemented. Since specific 
disclosures in annual reports have a capacity to give visibility to some aspects of 
corporate life companies should be required to publish the highest and the lowest 
wage, together with an analysis of the average wage differentials by gender, ethnicity 
and age of workers. Companies should be required to show that they are actively 
pursuing policies to strengthen equal opportunities, close gaps in gender and age pay 
and to end racial discrimination (Mitchell and Sikka, 2006). Such suggestions are also 
receiving support from institutional investors (The Observer, 17 June 2007). The 
proposals sketched here provide broad ideas for thinking about corporate governance 
and its links with developing a just and fair society. It may be argued that the above 
suggestions do not change the exploitative nature of capitalism. However, it is hoped 
that the politics of the proposed reforms will stimulate reflections upon the nature of 
the state, institutional structures, democracy, taxation, work and capitalism itself 
though these are beyond the scope of the present paper.  
 
As corporate governance processes shape the distribution of wealth, any proposals to 
change the status-quo are bound to be contested. Those persuaded by stakeholder 
theories may argue that businesses should “behave ethically and contribute to 
economic development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their 
families as well as of the local community and society at large” (World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development, 2000). In the opposite corner, neoliberals may 
be more relaxed about inequalities because of the belief that “a mobile society is 
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better than an equal one: disparities are tolerable if combined with meritocracy and 
general economic advance” (The Economist, 18 January 2007). Nevertheless, even 
neoliberals know that income and wealth inequalities lead to economic inefficiencies 
as poor people are priced out of many markets and thus limit economic growth and 
potentialities for profits. The multiplier effect of equitable distribution of wealth is 
much greater than that achieved by concentration of wealth in relatively few hands 
and goes a long way towards reducing poverty and social exclusion (Prahalad, 2004). 
A debate is long overdue and the outcomes would inevitably depend on how each 
group mobilises its political resources. 
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TABLE 1 
SHARE OF THE UK WEALTH 
TOTAL MARKETABLE WEALTH 
 
% of wealth owned by 
    1976 1986 1996 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
  
Most wealthy 1%  21 18 20 23 23 22 24 21 
Most wealthy 5%  38 36 40 43 44 42 45 40 
Most wealthy 10%  50 50 52 55 56 54 57 53 
Most wealthy 25%  71 73 74 75 75 72 75  72 
Most wealthy 50%  92 90 93 94 95 94 94 93 
 
Source: UK Office for National Statistics, (2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
SHARE OF THE UK WEALTH 
MARKETABLE WEALTH LESS VALUE OF DWELLINGS 
 
% of wealth owned by 
    1976 1986 1996 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003
  
Most wealthy 1%  29 25 26 34 33 34 37 34 
Most wealthy 5%  47 46 49 59 58 58 62 58 
Most wealthy 10%  57 58 63 72 73 72 74 71 
Most wealthy 25%  73 75 81 87 89 88 87  85 
Most wealthy 50%  88 89 94 97 98 98 98 99 
 
Source: UK Office for National Statistics, (2006). 
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TABLE 3 
SOME UK COMPANY DIRECTOR PENSIONS 
 
Director   Company (Year End)  Annual Pension
          £000s 
 
Lord Browne   BP (12.05)     991 
Sir Francis Mackay  Compass (12.05)    830 
Howard S Frank  Carnival (11.05)    795 
John Sunderland (1)  Cadbury Schweppes (12.05)   762 
Antony Burgmans  Unilever (12.05)    762 
Lawrence Fish   Royal Bank of Scotland (12.05)   761 
John Walsh (2)  BOC (9.05)     714 
Michael Bailey  Compass (12.05)    648 
Jeroen van der Veer  Royal Dutch Shell (12.05)   647 
Sir Tom Mckillop  AstraZeneca (12.05)    639 
Patrick Cescau  Unilever (12.05)    638 
Todd Stitzer   Cadbury Schweppes (12.05)   623 
Sir Julian Horn-Smith  Vodafone (3.06)    605 
Dr Jean-Pierre Garnier GlaxoSmithKline (12.05)   601 
Michael Geoghegan  HSBC      557 
Paul Walsh   Diageo (6.05)     556 
James Crosby   HBOS (12.05)     553 
Sir John Bond   HSBC (12.05)     546 
Sir Terry Leahy  Tesco (2.06)     546 
Keki Dadiseth (1)  Unilever (12.05)    542 
Sir David Prosser  Legal & General (12.05)   537 
Richard Harvey  Aviva (12.05)     527 
Mike Turner   BAE Systems (12.05)    523 
Dr John McAdam  ICI (12.05)     521 
Ken Hydon    Vodafone (3.06)    517 
Roger Urwin (1)  National Grid (3.06)    516 
Rudy Markham  Unilever (12.05)    514 
 
(1) Retired 2005 
(2) Resigned 2005. 
 
Source: Labour Research (2006).  
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APPENDIX 1 
TOP TEN EXCUSES FOR NOT PAYING THE NATIONAL MINIMUM 
WAGE (NMW) 
10. I only took him on as a favour  
9. The workers can't speak English  
8. He's over 65, so the national minimum wage doesn't apply  
7. She's on benefits - if you add those to her pay, it totals the NMW  
6. They can't cope on their own and it's more than they would get in their own country  
5. He's disabled  
4. I didn't think it applied to small employers  
3. I didn't think the workers were worth NMW  
2. But she only wanted £3 an hour  
1. He doesn't deserve it - he's a total waste of space  
Source: HM Revenue and Customs press release, dated 22 August 2006 
(http://www.gnn.gov.uk/Content/Detail.asp?ReleaseID=222124&NewsAreaID=2) 
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NOTES 
 
 
                                                 
1 The Companies Act 1985, Schedule 6 requires the following details to be published: 
(a) Directors' emoluments, including salary fees and bonuses; (b) Gains made by 
directors on the sale of share options; (c) Amounts paid to directors under long-term 
incentive schemes; (d) Number of directors to whom retirement benefits are accruing 
in respect of qualifying services in respect of money purchase schemes and defined 
benefit schemes; (e) Pensions in excess of the pensions to which they were entitled 
(this includes past as well as present directors) and; (f) Compensation to past or 
present directors for loss of office. The Act (as amended by various statutory 
instruments) requires that the remuneration of the directors should be disclosed where 
the aggregate directors' remuneration is effectively £200,000 or greater during the 
accounting period. The amount of £200,000 is based on (a)+(b)+(c) mentioned above. 
2 These disclosures are now governed by Section 411 of the Companies Act 2006.  
3 http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1974/Feb/1974-feb-labour-
manifesto.shtml; accessed 31 May 2007. 
4 http://www.conservative-party.net/manifestos/1979/1979-conservative-
manifesto.shtml 
5 As per http://www.unionhistory.info/timeline/1960_2000.php; accessed 4 Jun  2007. 
6 The disclosures were retained for the public sector where a “higher paid employee” 
is someone earning more than £70,000 a year (Accounting Standards Board, 2003). 
7 The Cadbury Code was supported by the London Stock Exchange and eventually 
became part of the listing requirements (London Stock Exchange, 1998). 
8 The recommendations became part of the London Stock Exchange Listing Rules and 
the Company Accounts (Disclosure of Directors' Emoluments) Regulations 1997. 
9 In October 2006, the rate was raised to £5.35 an hour for workers aged 22 and over, 
£4.45 per hour for 18-21 year olds and £3.30 an hour for 16-17 year old workers, 
considerably less than the rates advocated by trades unions 
10 ‘Living wage’ is taken to mean a wage above the national minimum wage so that 
the recipients can enjoy a certain standard of living. 
11 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2958208.stm; accessed 30 June 2006. 
12 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2958208.stm; accessed 30 June 2006. 
13A variety of other laws (e.g. the Insolvency Act 1986, the Financial Services Act 
1986, Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, the Enterprise Act 2002) also 
shape corporate governance processes. However, they are silent on equitable 
distribution of wealth. 
14Trades Union Congress press releases, 28 December 2006 
(http://www.tuc.org.uk/economy/tuc-12807-f0.cfm; accessed 28 December 2006). 
15 KPMG's Survey of Directors’ Compensation 2006 
(http://www.kpmg.co.uk/news/detail.cfm?pr=2620#; accessed on 18 September 
2006). 
16 The figure includes salary, bonuses, share options and incentives, but exclude their 
pension pot. If included this would take their rewards to well over £3 million. 
17 http://www.accountancymagazine.com/main.asp?storyid=9374; accessed on 22 
June 2007. 
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18 Available at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/ashe1006.pdf; accessed on 28 
December 2006. 
19 TUC press release, 9 September 2006. 
20 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2223653.stm; accessed on 15 September 2006. 
21 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/pay1006.pdf; accessed 15 December 2006. 
22 TUC press release, 10 September 2006. 
23 For example, it was reported that 300 workers at a restaurant chain were paid £3.75 
per hour, 30 per cent below the national minimum wage of £5.35, and tips made up 
the rest of their pay packet (The Independent, 20 May 2007). 
24 http://www.tuc.org.uk/economy/tuc-12357-f0.cfm; accessed 15 December 2006. 
25 The National Minimum Wage Act 1998 requires all employers to keep sufficient 
records to establish that they are paying their workers at least the minimum wage. 
Government appointed compliance officers can inspect the employer’s minimum 
wage records. 
26 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=1751; accessed 25 June 2007. 
27 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal_wealth/table13_5.xls 
28 Brewin Dolphin Securities press release, 11 July 2005. 
29  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/5059242.stm; accessed 8 June 2006. 
30 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/5047716.stm; accessed 6 June 2006 
31 Department of Work and Pensions press release, 7 June 2004. 
32 Pension  Age newsline, 17 June 2006;  
http://www.pensionsage.com/June%202006/June%20news/news170606.htm 
33 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/5104716.stm; accessed 22 June 2006. 
34http://www.csp.org.uk/director/newsandevents/news.cfm?item_id=ECD760F7B81C
8A42A543F572E3EBDF8F; accessed on 21 June 2006. 
35http://www.helptheaged.org.uk/engb/Campaigns/WinterDeaths/?&MSHiC=65001&
L=10&W=died%20&Pre=%3CFONT%20STYLE%3D%22color%3A%20%2300000
0%3B%20background-color%3A%20%23FFFF00%22%3E&Post=%3C/FONT%3E; 
accessed 30 April 2007. 
36 http://www.hpa.org.uk/hpa/news/articles/press_releases/2007/070322_tb.htm; also 
see The Guardian, 3 August 2004 
37 New Economics Foundation press release  
(http://www.neweconomics.org/gen/HSBCprofits_nefcallsforbankinguniversalservice
obligation060306.aspx; accessed 6 March 2006). 
38 As per Table D in UK quarterly national accounts published on 28 March 2007; 
available on http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/qna0307.pdf . 
39 Trades Union Congress press release, 4 January 2007. 
